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THE RISE OF SYSTEMATIC PRE-EXECUTION DELAY: 
PROPOSING A SOLUTION TO DECADES ON DEATH ROW 
Krista MacKay* 
Abstract 
Although the claim that death row inmates’ pre-execution delays 
violate the Eighth Amendment has been historically unsuccessful, the 
decision in Jones v. Chappell paved a new path to its success. In Jones, 
despite the Ninth Circuit’s disagreement, a federal judge in California 
became the first to rule that systematic delay has rendered California’s 
death penalty system unconstitutional. The court in Jones defined 
systematic delay as delay inherent to the state’s dysfunctional 
administration of the death penalty. Due to increasing pre-execution 
delays nationwide and recent initiatives to examine and repeal state death 
penalty systems, other state courts may soon come to recognize and 
declare systematic delay unconstitutional using reasoning similar to the 
court in Jones. This would likely require the Supreme Court to finally 
address the constitutionality of pre-execution delay. In the meantime, pre-
execution delay is problematic for inmates on death row—even if not yet 
declared unconstitutional—and a solution is necessary to uphold the 
purposes of the death penalty. One state attempting to address this 
problem is Florida. Florida recently passed the “Timely Justice Act,” the 
first legislation of its kind, in an effort to reduce postconviction delays 
for death row inmates. Although Florida’s Act has been the subject of 
heated controversy, California has since passed a similar proposition 
titled the “Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016.” This Note 
examines the limited existing legislation seeking to speed up the 
postconviction review process and ultimately proposes more effective 
recommendations for legislation to resolve systematic delay.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Of the 8124 people who received a death sentence between 1977 and 
2013, states have only executed seventeen percent.1 The thousands of 
prisoners currently on death row spend an average 15.5 years between 
sentencing and execution, a number that has steadily increased since the 
death penalty was reinstated in 1976.2 In response, death row inmates 
have argued that such lengthy execution delays violate the Eighth 
                                                                                                                     
 1. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2013—STATISTICAL 
TABLES 2 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf. 
 2. See id. at 14. 
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Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment.3 Coined 
“Lackey claims,”4 such assertions have been historically unsuccessful at 
both the state and federal levels.5 In continually denying certiorari to 
Lackey claims, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that a successful 
claim will require some degree of state-caused—systematic—delay.6  
In July 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California became the first court ever to recognize and declare the 
systematic delay of the state’s death penalty unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.7 
Jones v. Chappell8 defined systematic delay as excessive and 
unpredictable pre-execution delay inherent to the “dysfunctional 
administration of California’s death penalty system.”9 The court in Jones 
held that such systematic delay results in arbitrary execution; as for the 
few inmates who actually realize the possibility of death, their selection 
for execution will predominately depend upon the amount of time it takes 
them to proceed through California’s “dysfunctional post-conviction 
review process.”10 The court further ruled that such inherent delays 
deprive the death penalty of its deterrent and retributive purposes.11 
As its core authority for showing the state’s systematic delay, the court 
in Jones relied upon a comprehensive study of the state’s death penalty 
system performed by the California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice (Commission).12 The Commission Report 
found that delay penetrates every stage of California’s capital 
                                                                                                                     
 3. E.g., Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of 
certiorari). 
 4. See Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the 
Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 999 (2014). 
 5. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 390 (2001) (“[A]ppellate delay in a capital 
case is not cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a delay . . .  reflects 
the State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, the claim that the time has 
rendered the execution inhuman is a particularly strong one.”); Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (stating 
that it “may be appropriate to distinguish . . . among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse 
of the judicial system . . . ; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c) 
negligence or deliberate action by the State”).  
 7. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones 
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). The merits of the case remain influential although the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that it was barred from reviewing the claim because 
federal courts may not consider novel constitutional theories on habeas review. Davis, 806 F.3d 
at 541. 
 8. 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050. 
 9. Id. at 1053. 
 10. Id. at 1062. 
 11. Id. at 1063. 
 12. Id. at 1055–56. 
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postconviction review process.13 In 2008, the state’s elapsed time from 
sentencing to execution exceeded two decades,14 a delay much greater 
than the national average at that time and today.15 But California’s delay 
between sentencing and execution does not make it an extreme outlier 
when compared with the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (Bureau) Report.16 
According to the Bureau Report, as of year-end 2013, many states’ pre-
execution delays exceeded that of California.17  
Other states’ death penalty systems have also undergone extensive 
review like California, and a handful of states have recently implemented 
moratoriums on executions.18 The national rise in pre-execution delay, 
the increasing interest in reviewing state death penalty systems, and the 
recent trend of death penalty suspensions collectively suggest that other 
states may be well on their way to following the court in Jones in 
recognizing systematic delays of the death penalty.19 Systematic delay 
could moreover be the means for the Supreme Court to finally address a 
Lackey claim.20 Regardless, because pre-execution delay of the death 
penalty is not subsiding, it remains clear that a solution must be identified 
to ensure the death penalty’s constitutionality.  
Florida passed the “Timely Justice Act” in July of 2013, seeking to 
speed up the procedural timeline for death row inmates.21 Once an 
inmate’s appeals become final, the Act requires the governor to sign a 
warrant for execution within thirty days, which is to be carried out no 
more than 180 days later.22 The Act additionally addresses areas 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id. 
 14. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2008) [hereinafter COMMISSION 
REPORT]. 
 15. In 2008, the national average delay between sentencing and execution was 11.6 years, 
and in 2013 it was 15.5 years. See SNELL, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10. 
 16. See id. at 18 tbl.15 (listing states with similar average delay times). 
 17. Id. (showing Texas, Nevada, Georgia, Tennessee, Ohio, Maryland, and North Carolina 
as having longer pre-execution delays than California). 
 18. See, e.g., Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/674 (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). In 2003, the American Bar 
Association began performing its own assessments on several state capital punishment systems, 
primarily to determine the extent to which they achieve fairness and due process. AM. BAR ASS’N, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT i, http://www.americanbar.org/co 
ntent/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida/executivesummary.authcheckd
am.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
 19. See Newton, supra note 4, at 999 (“Jones is likely to serve as a catalyst for a renewed 
round of Lackey claims, in particular ‘systemic Lackey claims.’”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See S.B. 1750, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.) (legislative history of Timely Justice Act of 
2013, 2013 Fla. Laws 2596).  
 22. FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(b) (2015). 
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including legal representation and reporting requirements.23 As the first 
legislation of its kind,24 the Timely Justice Act has been the subject of 
great controversy.25 However, since the Act’s passing, California voters 
passed similar legislation in the November 2016 election.26 This Note 
analyzes the ability of legislation that speeds up the postconviction 
review process to alleviate the systematic delay recently identified in 
California’s death penalty system—delay that other states and even the 
Supreme Court may soon recognize as highly problematic.  
Part I of this Note provides a historical perspective, beginning with a 
brief evolution of the death penalty’s standards and then analyzing the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of Lackey claims. Part II examines the recent 
decision in Jones and explains why other states may also be experiencing 
systematic delay. Part III analyzes limited existing state legislation 
aiming to speed up postconviction review. Finally, Part IV proposes a 
solution to systematic delay, suggesting provisions for effective state 
legislation. 
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF LACKEY CLAIMS 
The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual clause has long been 
interpreted to prohibit arbitrary application of the death penalty. This Part 
provides a brief evolution of the death penalty’s non-arbitrary 
requirement and then analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment of Lackey 
claims. Although the court in Jones held that systematic delay violates 
the non-arbitrary requirement,27 the Supreme Court has yet to accept 
certiorari for a Lackey claim. 
A.  The Rise of the Non-arbitrary Requirement 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.28 Although the Constitution does not explicitly define cruel 
                                                                                                                     
 23. S.B. 1750.  
 24. Susanna Bagdasarova, Florida Accelerates Death Penalty Process with “Timely Justice 
Act,” PROJECT PRESS (Am. Bar Ass’n Death Penalty Representation Project, Washington, D.C.), 
Summer 2013, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/project_press/2013/summer/florida-
accelerates-death-penalty-process-with-timely-justice-ac.html. 
 25. See, e.g., David A. Love, Florida’s Timely Justice Act Is Neither Timely Nor Justice, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-a-
love/floridas-timely-justice-act-death-penalty_b_3283060.html. 
 26. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, Cal. Prop. 66, https://www.oag.ca.gov 
/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0096%20%28Death%20Penalty%29_0.pdf. 
 27. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., 
Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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and unusual,29 the Court has long held that this proscription must be 
construed according to society’s “evolving standards of decency.”30 In 
1972, petitioners in Furman v. Georgia31 argued that such societal 
standards had progressed to the point that the death penalty was no longer 
constitutional.32 The Court found that the death penalty was being 
selectively applied due to a lack of criteria for its imposition, which 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.33  
Although there was no majority opinion in Furman, the Court 
invalidated the petitioners’ death sentences, holding that the death penalty 
“could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a 
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.”34 In Furman, Justice William O. Douglas compared the death 
penalty’s selective application to the unusualness of getting struck by 
lightning.35 As Justice Potter Stewart explained, to “permit this unique 
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed” would clearly 
violate the Eighth Amendment.36 This need for reliability in the 
determination of death stemmed from the fact that “death is different,” 
unique from all other forms of punishment in its finality.37 The Court 
additionally recognized that allowing the death penalty to be arbitrarily 
imposed would no longer serve the fundamental penological goals of 
deterrence and retribution.38 The decision in Furman effectively 
suspended the death penalty, prompting states to enact new statutes that 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Matthew C. Brewer, Comment, Constitutional Law: Broadening the Criteria for 
Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 731, 732 (2003). 
 30. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
These standards come from “history and traditional usage, legislative enactments, and jury 
determinations.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
 31. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 32. See id. at 239. 
 33. Arbitrariness, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 16, 2015), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
arbitrariness. Specifically, the Court was concerned that the death penalty was being unevenly 
applied based on prejudices against minorities. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
 34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
 35. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
 36. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1973); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
305 (1976); see Furman, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 38. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring) (explaining “a major goal of 
the criminal law—to deter others by punishing the convicted criminal—would not be substantially 
served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat essential to 
influence the conduct of others,” and “when imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of 
infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be 
measurably satisfied”). 
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would safeguard against arbitrary sentencing.39 Four years later, in 1976, 
the Court in Gregg v. Georgia40 upheld the revised sentencing statutes of 
Florida, Georgia, and Texas as non-arbitrary in their application and 
therefore constitutional—effectively reinstating the death penalty.41 
Although scholars, including current Justices of the Supreme Court, 
continue to debate whether the death penalty constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment, the government unquestionably remains responsible 
for ensuring that courts do not arbitrarily impose the death penalty and 
that it furthers the aims of retribution and deterrence.42  
B.  A Brief History of the Supreme Court’s Treatment of Lackey 
Claims 
The claim that pre-execution delay violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
cruel and unusual standard was first raised to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the 1995 case of Lackey v. Texas.43 The defense attorney who represented 
petitioner Clarence Lackey has explained the claim’s arguments: first, a 
prolonged stay on death row was cruel and unusual because it inflicted a 
greater punishment than the death penalty; and second, such a lengthy 
delay no longer served the purposes of retribution and deterrence—
particularly when the state primarily caused the delay.44 Although the 
Court ultimately denied certiorari to Lackey, Justices Stephen G. Breyer 
and John P. Stevens agreed that Lackey’s claim was nonetheless 
important.45 Respecting denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens explained 
that over a century earlier, the Court recognized the uncertainty 
experienced by a confined prisoner awaiting execution as “one of the 
most horrible feelings,”46 and because that had been in reference to a 
four-week pre-execution delay, “that description should apply with even 
                                                                                                                     
 39. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 33.  
 40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 41. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 33. The revised sentencing statutes provided 
objective criteria to limit discretion in the death penalty’s imposition and permitted the court to 
consider an individual defendant’s character and record.  
 42. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1063–64 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., 
Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Blake J. Delaney, Comment, A Cruel and 
Unusual Application of the Proportionality Principle in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 459, 460 (2004) (noting that the debate of whether a punishment violates the cruel and 
unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment has been ongoing for almost 100 years). 
 43. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). In the years following, this argument became known as a “Lackey 
claim.” See Newton, supra note 4, at 980.  
 44. Newton, supra note 4, at 981–84. While the petitioner’s brief for certiorari did not 
address retribution or deterrence, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari included a brief 
discussion of these points. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
 45. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047. 
 46. Id. at 1045 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890)). 
 
7
MacKay: The Rise of Systematic Pre-Exclusion Delay: Proposing a Solution
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1170 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
greater force in the case of delays that last for many years.”47 Justice 
Stevens further opined that because such a claim had the “potential for 
far-reaching consequences,” lower courts should “serve as laboratories” 
to further study its merits before the Supreme Court addresses it.48  
Since Lackey, other death row inmates have also asserted that delays 
in the postconviction review process rendered their sentences 
unconstitutional. In Elledge v. Florida,49 the Supreme Court declined to 
address the constitutionality of a Florida inmate’s twenty-three year stay 
on death row.50 Respecting denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer argued that 
such an extended execution delay was unusual, whether compared to the 
death penalty’s practice at that time or to the practices of America and 
England when the Constitution was written.51 He additionally referred to 
the claim as “serious” because the state’s faulty post-conviction process 
was responsible for the delay.52 
In Knight v. Florida,53 Justice Breyer again dissented from the denial 
of certiorari of another Lackey claim, pressing that the Court should 
look to international courts for guidance, as many other countries have 
held lengthy pre-execution delays “inhuman, degrading, or unusually 
cruel.”54 In opposition, Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring with the 
majority in denial of certiorari, stated, “It is incongruous to arm capital 
defendants with an arsenal of ‘constitutional’ claims with which they 
may delay their executions, and simultaneously [allow them] to 
complain when [their] executions are inevitably delayed.”55 He 
additionally argued that the lower courts’ time of experimentation 
originally suggested by Justice Stevens in Lackey should be considered 
concluded, as courts have repeatedly rejected the claim as meritless.56 
Distinguishing this contention, however, Justice Breyer emphasized 
that most of the Lackey claims rejected at the lower court level 
“involved procedural failings that in part or in whole determined the 
outcome of the case,” and only four of the eight Lackey claims heard on 
the merits involved delays for which the state was arguably 
responsible.57 Thus, he argued it was “hardly evident” that the 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 1046.  
 48. Id. (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983)). 
 49. 525 U.S. 944 (1998). 
 50. Id. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. 528 U.S. 990 (1999).  
 54. Id. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 55. Id. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 992–93. 
 57. Id. at 998 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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experiment should be considered concluded.58 By pointing out the 
limited number of Lackey claims involving delay caused by the state, 
Justice Breyer suggested that a successful Lackey claim will require 
some degree of systematic delay.  
As Lackey claims continued to appear, the gap between death 
sentencings and executions continued to increase.59 In the 2009 case of 
Thompson v. McNeil,60 Justice Stevens argued that even the then-average 
delay of nearly thirteen years underscored “the fundamental inhumanity 
and unworkability of the death penalty as it is administered in the United 
States,” and surely the Florida petitioner’s stay on death row for thirty-
two years would be “unacceptably cruel.”61 But again, Justice Thomas, 
concurring with the denial of certiorari, argued, “It makes ‘a mockery of 
our system of justice . . . for a convicted murderer, who, through his own 
interminable efforts of delay . . . has secured the almost-indefinite 
postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite 
postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.’”62 Justice Breyer, 
however, stressed that a significant amount of the delay in William 
Thompson’s case occurred as a result of the state’s defective death penalty 
procedures, which were out of the petitioner’s control.63 Thus, the Court’s 
debate again centered on whether the pre-execution delay was caused by 
the state or self-inflicted. While the Justices have yet to agree on this issue 
in any of the Lackey claim cases to reach them, Justice Thomas’s 
arguments indicate he would likely agree that some degree of state-caused 
delay is necessary for a successful claim.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 999.  
 59. See, e.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
stay) (referring to an over-thirty-three-year stay on death row, Justice Breyer stated, “I have little 
doubt about the cruelty of so long a period of incarceration under sentence of death”); Smith v. 
Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 986 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am unaware of other executions 
that have taken place after so long a delay [as over thirty years], particularly when much of the 
delay at issue seems due to constitutionally defective sentencing proceedings.”); Foster v. Florida, 
537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that a twenty-seven-year confinement 
while awaiting execution would be unusual not only in America—where at the time the average 
delay was eleven to twelve years—but also in other nations, which held that delays of less than 
fifteen years were “degrading, shocking, or cruel”).  
 60. 556 U.S. 1114 (2009).   
 61. Id. at 1116 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
 62. Id. at 1117 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 
1995) (Luttig, J., concurring)). 
 63. Id. at 1120 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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Unlike previous denials of certiorari to Lackey claims,64 the 2009 case 
of Johnson v. Bredeson65 addressed whether pre-execution delay furthers 
the penological purposes of retribution and deterrence. Justice Stevens 
issued an opinion respecting denial of certiorari, joined by Justice Breyer, 
stating that lengthy pre-execution delay weakens the death penalty’s 
justifications.66 In response, Justice Thomas argued that “[s]uch views, 
no matter how ‘steadfast[ly]’ held are not grounds for enjoining 
petitioner’s execution or for granting certiorari.”67 He explained that 
delay is inevitable in providing inmates procedural safeguards, and 
although there are alternatives to delay, a system in which execution 
immediately follows sentencing would likely be unconstitutional.68 
More recently, Justice Anthony Kennedy indirectly weighed in on 
pre-execution delay. In the 2014 case of Hall v. Florida,69 the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether a mentally disabled capital 
defendant was eligible for the death penalty.70 Although the case did not 
present a Lackey claim, for those familiar with Justice Breyer’s stance on 
pre-execution delay, it came as no surprise that during the oral argument 
he pointed out that Freddie Hall had spent thirty-five years on death 
row.71 However, Justice Kennedy’s comments that followed were not 
only off-topic, but unexpected.  
JUSTICE KENNEDY: [T]he last ten people Florida has 
executed have spent an average of 24.9 years on death row. 
Do you think that that is consistent with the purposes of the 
death penalty, and . . . is it consistent with sound 
administration of the justice system? 
MR. WINSOR [counsel for the State of Florida]: Well, I 
certainly think it’s consistent with the Constitution, and I 
think that there are obvious 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: That wasn’t my question. 
MR. WINSOR: Oh, I’m sorry, I apologize. 
                                                                                                                     
 64. See, e.g., id. at 1116 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that “delaying 
an execution does not further public purposes of retribution and deterrence but only diminishes 
whatever possible benefit society might receive from the petitioner’s death”); Knight v. Florida, 
528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he longer the delay, the weaker the 
justification for imposing the death penalty in terms of punishment’s basic retributive or deterrent 
purposes.”). 
 65. 558 U.S. 1067 (2009).   
 66. Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
 67. Id. at 1072 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  
 68. Id. at 1072–73. 
 69. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).   
 70. See id. at 1991–92. 
 71. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (No 12-10882). 
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JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it consistent with . . . the purposes 
that the death penalty is designed to serve, and is it consistent 
with an orderly administration of justice? 
. . . . 
MR. WINSOR: It is consistent with the purposes of the death 
penalty certainly. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: General Winsor, maybe you should ask 
us . . . that question, inasmuch . . . as most of the delay has 
been because of rules that we have imposed. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, . . . let me . . . ask this. Of 
course most of the delay is at the hands of the defendant. In 
this case it was 5 years before there was a hearing . . . on the 
Atkins question. Has the attorney general of Florida 
suggested to the legislature . . . any measures, any 
provisions, any statutes, to expedite the consideration of 
these cases. 
MR. WINSOR: Your Honor, there was a statute enacted last 
session, . . . called the Timely Justice Act, that addresses a 
number of issues that you raise, and it’s presently being 
challenged in front of the Florida Supreme Court.72 
Justice Kennedy’s comments are significant because they may 
indicate his newfound agreement with the viewpoint of Justice Breyer 
and Justice Stevens that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to 
finally address Lackey claims. The fact that Justice Kennedy commented 
on the average time spent on death row may additionally suggest his 
interest in systematic execution delay73 similar to that recently recognized 
as unconstitutional in California.74 Moreover, his concern regarding the 
furtherance of penological purposes is notable, as it too lines up with the 
reasoning of the decision in Jones.75 
II.  THE RECOGNITION OF SYSTEMATIC DELAY 
This Part examines the recent case of Jones, which declared that the 
systematic delay of California’s death penalty system has rendered it 
unconstitutional.76 The court in Jones defined systematic delay as delay 
inherent to the state’s dysfunctional administration of the death penalty—
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 46–47.   
 73. See Newton, supra note 4, at 998. 
 74. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones 
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 75. See id. at 1063–65.  
 76. Id. at 1069. 
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affecting every stage of an inmate’s postconviction review process.77 This 
Part first provides an overview of California’s systematic delay, focusing 
on the Commission’s study which greatly influenced the decision in 
Jones. Then, after examining Jones, this Part explains that other states’ 
death penalty systems are also likely experiencing systematic delay.  
A.  Examining Jones v. Chappell 
In 1992, a twenty-eight-year-old Ernest Jones was arrested and 
charged with murder in California.78 He was then sentenced to death three 
years later in 1995.79 As of June 2014, Jones had spent twenty-two years 
in prison—nineteen of which he spent on death row awaiting final review 
of his conviction and sentence.80 Unfortunately, this elapsed time 
between sentencing and execution is representative of the death penalty 
system in California.81 
1.  An Overview of California’s Systematic Delay  
The court in Jones relied greatly upon the Commission’s 
comprehensive study of the California’s death penalty system.82 
California established the Commission in 2004, in response to unbiased 
study and review in other states which had resulted in considerable 
improvements to the criminal justice system.83 The Commission was the 
first official body to undertake review of California’s death penalty since 
the system was reinstated in 1977.84 The final Commission Report, 
released in 2008, found that the state’s death penalty system is 
dysfunctional—plagued by backlog and delay at every stage of an 
inmate’s postconviction review process.85  
A defendant sentenced to death in California, like nearly all other 
death penalty states,86 is entitled to three stages of postconviction 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See id. at 1053.  
 78. First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Prisoner in State Custody at 
415, Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (No. CV-09-2158-CJC) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].  
 79. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1052–53. 
 80. See id. Jones was additionally expected to spend several more years in the process of 
reviewing his case. See id. at 1053. 
 81. See id. (“Indeed, for most, systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely that the 
death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly transformed into 
one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, with the remote possibility of 
death.”).  
 82. See id. at 1055. 
 83. Charge, CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, http://web.archive.org/web/201 
60707234556/http://ccfaj.org/?reqp=1&reqr=nzcdYaOjp253YzWyqN==. 
 84. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.  
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California 
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review.87 These stages consist of an automatic direct appeal to the 
California Supreme Court, a state habeas petition to the California 
Supreme Court, and a federal habeas petition to a federal district court.88 
A defendant may then appeal decisions by the California Supreme Court 
on the direct appeal and state habeas claim to the U.S. Supreme Court by 
petition for writ of certiorari.89 Further, a decision by the federal district 
court on the federal habeas claim may be appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and then to the U.S. Supreme Court.90  
Delay for death row inmates in California first sets in while awaiting 
appointment of counsel to handle direct appeals to the California 
Supreme Court.91 According to the Commission Report, appointment of 
counsel for the direct appeal takes an average of three to five years.92 
Cases are then scheduled for a hearing before the California Supreme 
Court.93 However, the briefing process can take up to four years, followed 
by a wait of two to three years until oral arguments are scheduled.94 Most 
inmates thus spend a total of twelve to fourteen years litigating their direct 
appeals before the California Supreme Court.95 The court in Jones 
attributed much of this delay to the state’s underfunding of its death 
penalty system, resulting in a “severe shortage of qualified attorneys 
available to accept appointment as counsel on direct appeal.”96  
                                                                                                                     
Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495, 498, 501, 502 (2009); Death Penalty Appeals Process, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, http://www.capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/
dpappealsprocess (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
 87. Id. at 21. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 21–22. This postconviction review process is almost identical in all capital states. 
See Post Conviction in Capital Cases, CAP. PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, 
http://www.capitalpunishmentincontext.org/issues/postconviction (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) 
(discussing the appellate and habeas review process in capital states). 
 91. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones 
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). Indigent death row prisoners have a constitutional right to 
court-appointed counsel for their initial appeal to the state court. JAMES R. ACKER, QUESTIONING 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 236 (2014). Although this constitutional right does not exist at the later 
stages of review, most states provide statutory rights to court appointed counsel in postconviction 
proceedings. Id.; see e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1240 (2016).  
 92. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 23. Delay in appointment of counsel postpones 
certification of the record’s accuracy, which must be completed within 120 days of appointment 
as required by California Penal Code Section 190.8(g). Id. at 23 n.28. 
 93. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 23. 
 94. See id. at 44.  
 95. Id. at 45. 
 96. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1056. For instance, “the Office of the State Public Defender’s 
budget has been cut and its staff reduced,” and private appointed counsel are paid at a low rate. 
Id. 
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Although prompt appointment of habeas counsel would enable the 
state habeas petition to be drafted during the direct appeal proceedings 
and then swiftly filed upon the direct appeal’s conclusion, the 
Commission regrettably found that the average delay in appointing state 
habeas counsel is eight to ten years in California.97 This number of 
prisoners without state habeas counsel has continually risen in the state.98 
As of June 2014, there were 352 prisoners awaiting appointment of state 
habeas counsel.99 Delays in appointment of state habeas counsel “can 
again be traced to underfunding issues similar to those on direct 
appeal.”100 Once counsel is appointed and files the habeas petition, the 
Commission reported that there is an additional delay of 1.8 years until 
the California Supreme Court issues a decision.101 This delay, however, 
has more than doubled since the Commission Report; in 2014, it took 
around four years from the filing of the petition until a decision was 
issued.102 Overall, an inmate will have spent seventeen years or more by 
the time he completes his direct appeal and state habeas review before the 
California Supreme Court.103  
When the court denies a state habeas petition, an inmate may then file 
a habeas petition in federal court.104 The Commission found that the delay 
from a habeas petition’s filing to a grant or denial by the federal court 
averaged 6.2 years.105 Including a potential appeal to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and an appeal therefrom to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the federal habeas review stage in California takes an 
average of 10.4 years.106 The court in Jones found that state habeas 
proceedings significantly affect federal habeas proceedings.107 For 
instance,  
if an inmate discovers new facts in the federal proceeding 
that were not before the California Supreme Court when it 
decided the state habeas petition, that inmate must generally 
halt the federal proceeding and return to the California 
                                                                                                                     
 97. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 24. 
 98. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1058 (“[A]s of June 2014, 352 inmates—nearly half of Death 
Row—were without habeas corpus counsel. And that number is up from 291 inmates awaiting 
appointment of habeas counsel in 2008.” (citation omitted)).  
 99. Id. Comparatively, seventy-one death row prisoners were awaiting counsel for direct 
appeal. Id. at 1056. 
 100. Id. at 1058. 
 101. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 24. 
 102. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1059. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).  
 105. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 57. 
 106. See id. at 58. 
 107. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1059. 
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Supreme Court by way of an exhaustion petition to present 
to it the new facts and exhaust the state remedy.”108  
The Commission found that “74% of federal habeas applications filed by 
California death row inmates are stayed for the exhaustion of state 
remedies.”109 Delay for failure to exhaust is also a problem that stems 
from the underfunding of state habeas counsel; this underfunding forces 
federal habeas counsel “to conduct an investigation at federal government 
expense to determine all the facts necessary to support unexhausted 
federal constitutional claims and to discover facts necessary to prove 
exhausted claims.”110  
The Commission found that for those who are denied relief at every 
level of postconviction review, the total time spent between the judgment 
of death and execution is twenty to twenty-five years.111 Also notable, 
California has not carried out an execution since 2006.112 Such prolonged 
delay attributable to the state’s dysfunctional administration of the death 
penalty system is what the court ultimately considered systematic delay.  
After the court sentenced Jones to death in 1995, he waited roughly 
four years until he received counsel for his direct appeal.113 He then 
waited another four years for the California Supreme Court to affirm his 
sentence in March of 2003.114 Altogether, about eight years passed for 
Jones from the imposition of his death sentence until the completion of 
his automatic appeal.115 Jones received state habeas counsel in October 
of 2000, five years after his sentence was imposed and while he was still 
litigating his direct appeal.116 The court waited 6.5 years after Jones’s 
filing to ultimately deny his state habeas petition.117 Jones filed the 
relevant petition for federal habeas review in March of 2010, and he 
                                                                                                                     
 108. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus to 
exhaust all remedies available in state court); see Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1059 (explaining that 
if an inmate discovers new facts that were not in front of the state court when the state court ruled 
on the habeas petition, then the inmate must halt federal proceedings and return to state court). 
 109. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 58.  
 110. Judge Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 697, 748 (2007). 
 111. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 25. Although the opinion in Jones says “the 
process will likely take 25 years or more,” Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1054, this is misleading as the 
court’s ultimate authority came from the Commission Report. Comparatively, the national 
average lapse between sentencing and execution in 2008 was 11.6 years. See SNELL, supra note 
1, at 14 tbl.10. 
 112. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.  
 
15
MacKay: The Rise of Systematic Pre-Exclusion Delay: Proposing a Solution
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1178 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
amended his claim in April of 2014, asserting that California’s 
systematically delayed postconviction review process results in arbitrary 
executions and serves no penological purpose.118 
2.  The Court’s Reasoning 
The court explained that as a result of such systematic delay, 
California’s death penalty only becomes a reality for a small number of 
prisoners.119 As for the few that do realize this reality, 
their selection for execution will not depend on whether their 
crime was one of passion or of premeditation, on whether 
they killed one person or ten, or on any other proxy for the 
relative penological value that will be achieved by executing 
that inmate over any other . . . . Rather, it will depend upon 
a factor largely outside an inmate’s control, and wholly 
divorced from the penological purposes the State sought to 
achieve by sentencing him to death in the first instance: how 
quickly the inmate proceeds through the State’s 
dysfunctional post-conviction review process.120 
Just as it would be arbitrary to randomly select which members of the 
population to sentence to death, the court found that it is arbitrary to 
randomly select within a group of death row inmates which ones to carry 
out executions against.121  
The court additionally held that for the random few that do face 
execution, they will have remained on death row for so long that their 
execution will no longer serve the purposes of retribution and 
deterrence.122 Deterrence, the notion that implementing punishment 
discourages crime,123 is dependent upon its certainty and timeliness.124 
The execution delay inherent to California’s death penalty system has 
blatantly made executions untimely and has additionally made executions 
uncertain. With no executions since 2006 and only thirteen total since 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 1060–61. 
 119. See id. at 1062. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 1063 (“Arbitrariness in execution is still arbitrary, regardless of when in the 
process the arbitrariness arises.”). 
 122. Id.  
 123. STEPHEN STANKO ET AL., LIVING IN PRISON: A HISTORY OF THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM 
WITH AN INSIDER’S VIEW 56 (2004). 
 124. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1064; United States v. Panico, 308 F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 1962) 
(“There can be little doubt that the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent is related not only 
to the quality of the possible punishment but to the certainty and promptness as well.”); STANKO, 
supra note 123, at 57 (“Deterrence is dependent upon the severity, speed, and swiftness of the 
punishment.”). 
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1978, more death row inmates in California have died from natural causes 
than from execution.125 Thus, “[a]s the ultimate in-between punishment 
between life imprisonment and the death penalty,” a death row inmate 
cannot be certain when or if his sentence will ever be carried out.126 
Retribution rests on the theory that one deserves to be disciplined for 
committing an offense.127 In the context of capital sentencing, retribution 
accordingly means that inmates are executed because they deserve it.128 
Even dating back to Furman in 1972, the Court recognized that an 
infrequent application of the death penalty would cease to serve any 
retributive purpose.129 However, due to the excessive delays in 
California’s death penalty system, those who have committed the most 
heinous crimes for which a death sentence is imposed are for all practical 
purposes merely serving out life sentences.130  
3.  Distinguishing Jones from Prior Unsuccessful Lackey Claims  
As the court in Jones stated, courts often reject Lackey claims based 
on two justifications: “first, that the delay is reasonably related to the 
state’s effort to safeguard the inmate’s constitutional rights by ensuring 
the accuracy of its death conviction and sentence, and second, that the 
delay is caused by the petitioner himself, and therefore cannot be 
constitutionally problematic.”131 The court, however, found that these 
bases for denying Lackey claims were not applicable to California’s 
administration of the death penalty.132 Although the State in Jones did not 
argue that California’s delay is rational or necessary to ensure the 
accuracy of inmates’ convictions, the court nonetheless noted that these 
arguments would have been unreasonable.133 As evidence, the court cited 
to the Commission’s proposed reforms to California’s death penalty 
system which would lower the total elapsed time between sentencing and 
execution from twenty-five years to the then national average of eleven 
to fourteen years.134 The court moreover found that the state itself, not the 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062 (“For every one inmate executed by California, seven 
have died on Death Row, most from natural causes.”). 
 126. Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: Why 
Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1585, 1620 (2013). 
 127. See STANKO ET AL., supra note 123, at 56. 
 128. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 129. See id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). 
 130. See Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 1065–66. 
 133. See id. at 1066. 
 134. Id. at 7–10, 25–26. Ninth Circuit Judge Arthur Alarcón has similarly stated that delays 
are not “inevitable” (as Justice Thomas suggested), so long as California takes action to correct 
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inmates, was responsible for the majority of delay in California’s post-
conviction review process;135 there was no basis to determine that 
California’s death row inmates “are simply more dilatory, or have 
stronger incentives to needlessly delay the capital appeals process” than 
other states’ death row inmates.136 Rejecting popular reasoning for 
denying Lackey claims, the court ultimately attributed the delay in Jones’ 
case to the state’s inherently dysfunctional death penalty system.137 
B.  Nationwide Systematic Delay  
Although the Central District of California is the first to recognize and 
declare systematic delay of the death penalty unconstitutional, other 
states do not seem far behind. Increasing pre-execution delays, state death 
penalty system assessments, and governor-imposed moratoriums suggest 
that systematic delay likely exists outside of California.  
1.  Pre-execution Delays Across America 
Delay has not always plagued executions; in colonial and early 
American times, authorities typically carried out executions within a 
matter of days, weeks, or sometimes months if someone contested the 
case.138 However, from 1930 to 1970, the average length of time between 
sentencing and execution in the United States rose to 36.7 months.139 
Following the death penalty’s reinstatement in 1977, the Bureau began 
tracking capital punishment statistics, including the elapsed time from 
sentencing to execution.140 Because executions were sparse in the 
immediate years following the reinstatement, there are no reliable 
averages of execution delays dating that far back.141 However, in 1984, 
the first time that there were enough executions to formulate a reliable 
number, the Bureau reported that the average elapsed time from 
sentencing to execution for all inmates totaled 6.2 years.142 This average 
had more than doubled by 2013, increasing to 15.5 years.143 With inmates 
lingering on death row for such lengthy periods of time, more inmates 
                                                                                                                     
its dysfunctional system. Alarcón, supra note 110, at 711 (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 
990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
 135. See id. at 1067. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 226 (2012). 
 139. EVAN J. MANDERY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN: A BALANCED EXAMINATION 
473 (2d. ed. 2012). 
 140. See SNELL, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10.  
 141. See id.  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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have died of old age than of executions in states with high death row 
populations.144  
These execution delays common to present day America vary 
amongst states.145 But while the Commission Report found California’s 
elapsed time from sentencing to execution exceeded two decades as of 
2008,146 the Bureau Report does not reflect that California is an outlier 
for execution delay. As of year-end 2013, the Bureau Report reflects that 
the average time spent under a sentence of death in California is 16.1 
years.147 Comparatively, Tennessee, Kentucky, Nevada, and Idaho 
prisoners experience longer execution delays,148 while Georgia, Ohio, 
North Carolina, and Florida prisoners experience delays of around fifteen 
years.149 States like these, with execution delays exceeding or closely 
approaching that of California and the national average, are most 
vulnerable to a court finding the delays systematic and potentially 
unconstitutional in the wake of Jones.  
2.  State Death Penalty Assessments  
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) assessments of state death 
penalty systems also suggest that systematic delay is not isolated to 
California. To date, the ABA has conducted assessments and released 
reports on the death penalty’s administration in twelve states: Alabama, 
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.150 The assessments 
compare each state with over ninety ABA benchmarks on the 
constitutional administration of the death penalty.151 Reports include 
detailed sections covering various aspects of states’ death penalty 
systems similar to those that the Commission Report outlined in 
California.152 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Newton, supra note 4, at 989. 
 145. See SNELL, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.15.  
 146. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. The Report additionally states that “[t]he 
average lapse of time between pronouncement of a judgment of death and execution in California 
is 17.2 years, but using an ‘average’ number may be misleading since only thirteen have been 
executed.” Id. at 22.  
 147. SNELL, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.15. 
 148. Id. Inmates in these states respectively spend an average of 18.4 years, 18.3 years, 17.7 
years, and 16.2 years on death row. Id. 
 149. Id. Inmates in these states respectively spend an average of 15.5 years, 15.4 years, 15.2 
years, 15.1 years, and 15 years on death row. Id. 
 150. State Death Penalty Assessments, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
crsj/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project/state_death_penalty_assessments.html 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
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With respect to legal defense, the state assessments found that most 
states do not have “the kind of legal services system that is necessary to 
ensure that defendants charged with capital offenses or on death row 
receive the defense they require.”153 In fact, “[f]ew states meet the 
standards set out by the ABA Guidelines on the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003)” (ABA 
Guidelines).154 The state assessments identified that most examined states 
“lack rigorous qualification standards for and monitoring of counsel 
appointed to capital cases.” Because the ABA Guidelines “embody the 
current consensus about what is required to provide effective defense 
representation in capital cases,”155 it follows that these shortcomings 
likely result in less than effective representation, which the Commission 
Report found contributes systematic delay.156 The state assessments also 
identified inadequate compensation of counsel in the majority of 
examined states much like in California.157 Several state assessments even 
resulted in the ABA recommending moratoriums on executions until states 
adequately comply with the assessments’ recommendations.158 The state 
assessments collectively demonstrate that other states are facing many of 
the same problems responsible for delay in California’s death penalty 
system. It is therefore possible that states such as these will soon 
recognize systematic delay in their own death penalty systems. 
                                                                                                                     
 153. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE STATE OF THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 7 (2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratorium/aba_sta
te_of_modern_death_penalty_web_file.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 154. Id. at 7.  
 155. AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 920 (2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 156. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 57–58. 
 157. See State Death Penalty Assessments, supra note 150. 
 158. Id. The ABA recommended moratoriums in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and Tennessee. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE 
ALABAMA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT iv (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/alabama/report.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR 
ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA 
DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT v (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migr 
ated/moratorium/assessmentproject/georgia/report.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING 
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE INDIANA DEATH PENALTY 
ASSESSMENT REPORT viii (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/ 
assessmentproject/indiana/report.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND 
ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE TENNESSEE DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT 
REPORT ix (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentp 
roject/tennessee/finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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3.  Death Penalty Repeals and Moratoriums  
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia to date have abolished 
the death penalty.159 Meanwhile, Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington are currently under governor-imposed moratoriums—all 
four states acknowledging delay of the death penalty system as a 
motivating factor.160 Explaining his 2015 decision, Pennsylvania 
Governor Tom Wolf stated that the “the only certainty in the current 
system is that the process will be drawn out, expensive, and painful for 
all involved.”161 Washington Governor Jay Inslee similarly commented 
in support of his 2014 decision that Washington’s “death sentences are 
neither swift nor certain.”162 Likewise, then-Oregon Governor John 
Kitzhaber expressed concerns over pre-execution delay, stating in 2011, 
“The reality is that Oregon’s death row is an extremely expensive life 
prison term.”163  
A combination of state execution delays that continue to exceed those 
in California and the national average, a public push for state death 
penalty review, and gubernatorial moratoriums on executions are all good 
indications that the system is in a state of flux. Other states may 
accordingly soon recognize and declare systematic delays 
unconstitutional using reasoning similar to the court in Jones, which 
would likely require the Supreme Court to finally address pre-execution 
delay. 
                                                                                                                     
 159. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).  
Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have abolished the death penalty. Id. 
 160. See Statements from Governors of Pennsylvania, Washington, Colorado, and Oregon 
Halting Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5792 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2017); see also, e.g., Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2013-006 (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/COexecutiveorder.pdf (“If the State of Colorado is 
going to undertake the responsibility of executing a human being, the system must operate 
flawlessly. Colorado’s system for capital punishment is not flawless.”).  
 161. Peter Hall, Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf Halts Death Penalty, MORNING CALL (Feb. 
13, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-pa-death-penalty-moratorium-
tom-wolf-20150213-story.html (quoting Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf). 
 162. Governor Jay Inslee, Governor Inslee’s Remarks Announcing a Capital Punishment 
Moratorium (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
20140211_death_penalty_moratorium.pdf.  
 163. Press Release, Oregon Governor’s Office, Gov. Kitzhaber Issues Reprieve—Calls for 
Action on Capital Punishment (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.oregon.gov/newsroom/
Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?newsid=589.  
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III.  LEGISLATION MINIMIZING SYSTEMATIC DELAY 
Some states have or are in the process of enacting legislation in efforts 
to reduce delays in the postconviction review process. This Part examines 
whether such legislation may provide a solution to the systematic delay 
recently recognized in California—delay that other states and the 
Supreme Court may soon identify.  
A.  Florida’s “Timely Justice Act” 
In June 2013, Florida passed the “Timely Justice Act” with the 
legislative intent to resolve all postconviction actions as quickly as 
possible.164 To accomplish this objective, the Act addresses areas 
including legal representation, reporting requirements, and—most 
controversially—death warrants.165 As the first legislation of its kind,166 
the Timely Justice Act has sparked great debate. While its supporters 
contend it will minimize pre-execution delay, opponents argue that it will 
“exacerbate existing problems in a system already plagued by errors and 
a lack of funding and resources.”167 
1.  Key Provisions of the Timely Justice Act 
With respect to legal representation, the Act seeks to protect inmates 
by prohibiting attorneys from representing a capital defendant for five 
years if, on two separate occasions, an attorney provided “constitutionally 
deficient representation” in capital postconviction proceedings for which 
relief was granted.168 This encourages competent lawyering that could 
reduce delays caused by ineffective assistance of counsel—delay which 
contributes to California’s systematic delay. Still, the potential reduction 
in the number of available attorneys could simultaneously create delay of 
its own. Moreover, even assuming available qualified attorneys remain, 
the Act requires the court to grant relief for deficient representation in 
order for attorney suspension to take effect, and surely a large amount of 
deficient representation is not granted relief, goes unnoticed, or perhaps 
is not realized until years later.  
The Act additionally reopens a Capital Collateral Regional Counsel 
(CCRC) office in the northern part of Florida.169 CCRC exclusively 
                                                                                                                     
 164. See S.B. 1750, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.) (legislative history of Timely Justice Act of 
2013, 2013 Fla. Laws 2596). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Bagdasarova, supra note 24. 
 167. Id. 
 168. State of Fla. Appropriations Committee, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, 
S.B. 1750, at 2 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/1750/Analyses/
2013s1750.ap.PDF. 
 169. Id. 
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handles postconviction review and receives compensation from the 
state.170 Florida’s northern CCRC office was terminated in 2003, in favor 
of a pilot program of private appointed attorneys meeting minimum 
capital experience requirements.171 Unfortunately, the pilot program was 
widely criticized for providing poor lawyering.172 Reopening the northern 
CCRC office will accordingly provide capital defendants with more 
effective counsel, which will in turn reduce delays in postconviction 
review. This provision of the Act better addresses delay caused by 
ineffective assistance of counsel than does placing attorneys who have 
provided deficient representation on probation because it prevents the 
delay at its root cause. The availability of effective state counsel would 
additionally help to solve delays in appointment of counsel—another area 
of California’s systematic delay.  
The Act fails, however, to provide a remedy for the many death row 
inmates that may have received ineffective assistance of counsel during 
the pilot program’s existence.173 The ABA contends that “many of the 
prisoners whose appeals were exhausted under the pilot program may 
now be subject to expedited execution procedures without appointment 
of new counsel.”174 As for prisoners who have not yet exhausted their 
appeals, the Act permits attorneys previously appointed through the pilot 
program to continue representing death row inmates in their appeals.175 
The Act also increases the amount of capital defendants that those 
attorneys may represent at one time from five to ten.176 This could cause 
delays at the federal habeas stage if attorneys from the pilot program 
provided or continue to provide poor lawyering resulting in the failure to 
exhaust available state remedies. Considering that these attorneys may 
now double their caseloads of capital defendants, the risk of delay for 
failure to exhaust might become even greater. Although the faults of the 
pilot program are specific to Florida, they reinforce the importance of 
competent habeas counsel in reducing systematic delay as recognized in 
California.  
In addition to addressing legal representation, the Act aims to remedy 
delay through the imposition of reporting requirements on courts. For 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See Gary Blankenship, Capital Cases Pilot Program Reviewed, FLA. BAR NEWS (Oct. 
15, 2003), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNnews01.nsf/Articles/A9527C3261C90D2
085256DBB007378D9.   
 171. Bagdasarova, supra note 24. 
 172. Id. (“Florida Supreme Court Justice Raoul Cantero . . .  described the work of the 
appointed lawyers as ‘[s]ome of the worst lawyering’ he had ever seen.”). 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. See id. 
 176. S.B. 1750, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla) (legislative history of Timely Justice Act of 2013, 
2013 Fla. Laws 2596). 
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instance, the Act requires the “Florida Supreme Court [to] annually report 
to the [Legislature] the status of each capital case in which a 
postconviction action has been filed that has been continuously pending 
for more than [three] years.”177 While this provision enables the state to 
monitor delays, a more effective provision would set out a plan for 
remedying them. 
Most controversially, the Timely Justice Act seeks to expedite the 
death penalty process by requiring the governor to sign an execution 
warrant within thirty days of the clemency process’ conclusion and to 
schedule an execution within 180 days therefrom.178 Although the Act’s 
execution warrant timeline does protect against delay, neither California 
nor previous Lackey claims have recognized delay after the conclusion of 
clemency. The court in Jones nonetheless considered the total elapsed 
time between sentencing and execution in defining systematic delay, 
suggesting that systematic delay includes delay after the conclusion of 
postconviction review.179 Even so, this provision of the Act would only 
minimally contribute to resolving California’s systematic delay because 
its biggest delays occur during the automatic appeal, the state habeas 
petition, and the federal habeas petition.180  
2.  Responses to the Act and its Ability to Alleviate  
Systematic Delay 
Although the Timely Justice Act offers meaningful insight as to how 
systematic delay might be reduced, it has not been widely championed, 
particularly in light of the ABA’s state assessment of Florida’s death 
penalty system. The ABA in 2006 found that multiple areas of Florida’s 
death penalty system “fall[] short in the effort to afford every capital 
defendant fair and accurate procedures” including insufficient 
compensation for postconviction review counsel and lack of qualified and 
properly monitored postconviction review counsel.181 These systematic 
problems, the ABA reported, contribute to Florida having the highest 
exoneration rate in the country. 182  
 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Id. 
 178. FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(a) (2015). 
 179. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056–59 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., 
Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 180. Id. 
 181. AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY 
SYSTEMS: THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT iii (2006), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida/re
port.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 182. Bagdasarova, supra note 24. 
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Upon proposal of the Timely Justice Act, the ABA therefore 
expressed concern that by accelerating postconviction review, the 
opportunity for wrongful conviction would be increased.183 President 
Laurel Bellows of the ABA even wrote to Florida’s Governor Rick Scott 
urging him to veto the Act.184 She wrote, “Florida’s existing system 
cannot ensure fairness or accuracy, which must be the hallmarks of any 
case in which the death penalty is sought. The legislation before you does 
little to correct or prevent miscarriages of justice in cases where a 
person’s life is at stake . . . .”185  
Death row inmates have similarly questioned the Act’s efforts to 
speed up postconviction review. Less than a month after Florida passed 
the Act, over 100 death row inmates filed a challenge to the Florida 
Supreme Court, arguing that “[c]onstitutional protections must not be lost 
to expediency.”186 Petitioners alleged, amongst other claims, that the 
Act’s time requirements for issuing death warrants prevent inmates from 
pursuing other capital proceedings, such as successive postconviction 
litigation, and infringe upon the court’s authority to regulate practice and 
procedure.187 The Florida Supreme Court, however, upheld the Act as 
constitutional.188 
In considering the impact that Florida’s Timely Justice Act could have 
on California’s death penalty system, it must be noted that, unlike 
California, studies of Florida’s death penalty system have not yet focused 
on its delays or their causes. Nonetheless, while the Commission Report 
found that capital defendants in California who are denied relief at every 
level of postconviction review spend between twenty and twenty-five 
years on death row, the Bureau’s reports track California and Florida’s 
pre-execution delays on a much closer scale. According to the Bureau’s 
most recent report, California inmates spend an average of 16.1 years 
between sentencing and execution while Florida inmates experience 
average pre-execution delays of 15.0 years.189 That Florida is 
experiencing delays on a similar scale to California and has passed an Act 
seeking to reduce delays therefore suggests that Florida too may be 
experiencing systematic delay.  Accordingly, although the Timely Justice 
Act was not written with an eye to California’s systematic delay, it offers 
insight as to how systematic delay might best be addressed.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See id. 
 184. Letter from Laurel G. Bellows, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Rick Scott, Fla. Governor 
(May 15, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013may16_ 
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 185. Id. 
 186. Bagdasarova, supra note 24. 
 187. E.g., Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014). 
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Even though the Act has received criticism for speeding up 
postconviction review, it is significant that the Act addresses problems 
that the ABA’s state assessment of Florida’s death penalty system 
identified. The Act makes efforts to ensure qualified and properly 
monitored postconviction review counsel in light of Florida’s leading 
exoneration rate. These provisions would be beneficial to California as 
well as other states in reducing, or at the very least, preventing delays in 
postconviction review. However, the Act fails to offer a solution to the 
ABA’s finding that postconviction review counsel in Florida are 
insufficiently compensated. This is troublesome considering that 
California found inadequate compensation of counsel contributes to 
various delays throughout postconviction review.190 In California, 
inadequate compensation of counsel initially creates delays in 
appointment of counsel at the automatic appeal and state habeas review, 
which in turn causes delays in the filing of briefs and the issuance of 
decisions.191 California also found that insufficient compensation in hand 
with underfunding of counsel contribute to delays at the federal level of 
review when claims are stayed for failure to exhaust available state 
remedies.192 These delays in California suggest that it was an oversight 
for the Timely Justice Act to ignore the ABA’s finding that Florida 
insufficiently compensates postconviction review counsel. Similar to the 
universal applicability of the Act’s provisions regarding competent 
counsel, adequate compensation and funding of counsel would help to 
alleviate postconviction delays in California and at least contribute to 
preventing, if not reducing, delays nationwide.  
Altogether, the Act’s efforts to provide competent postconviction 
counsel have the potential to reduce systematic delay. Still, the Act fails 
to address Florida’s inadequate compensation of counsel—California’s 
seemingly biggest source of delay. Although remedying this problem 
would likely reduce delays further down the chain of postconviction 
review, the Act could additionally propose timelines for the appointment 
of counsel, filing of briefs, and issuance of decisions.  
B.  California’s Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 
In the November 8, 2016 election, California voters passed the 
Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, presented on the 
California ballot as Proposition 66. The Proposition seeks to eradicate 
wastes, delays, and inefficiencies in California’s death penalty system 
through amendments and additions to California’s Penal and 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See Alarcón, supra note 110, at 717–21.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  
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Government Codes.193 Although the Proposition contains provisions 
sure to reduce delays, it also presents new issues. Proponents filed a suit 
on November 9, 2016 to block the Proposition from taking effect.194 
1.  State Habeas Corpus Petitions 
The Proposition first proposes to shorten delays at the state habeas 
level by granting initial jurisdiction over state habeas corpus proceedings 
to the trial courts. Petitioners will be required to file their original 
petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court where the judgment 
of death was entered, unless good cause exists for the petition to be heard 
in another court.195  In ruling on a petition, the trial court must “issue a 
statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its 
decision[].”196 Within thirty days, petitioners may then appeal the trial 
court’s findings to the district courts of appeal, who will be “required to 
file an opinion on the rulings of the trial court before the Supreme Court 
reviews the case.”197 If the California Supreme Court disagrees with the 
appellate court, it may reverse the appellate court’s decision and “send 
the matter back for modification or for return to the trial court for further 
hearings on any or all of the habeas corpus claims raised in the 
petition.”198 Altogether, the Proposition’s requirement that petitioners file 
their initial habeas corpus petitions in the trial courts adds two additional 
layers of review to California’s death penalty system.199  
This shift in initial habeas corpus jurisdiction is unquestionably an 
effort to alleviate the California Supreme Court’s backlog. Yet opponents 
point out that California counties do not proportionately issue death 
sentences.200 In the past ten years, California has sentenced 188 people to 
death, 136 of which were sentenced in just five counties.201 Opponents of 
the Proposition accordingly fear that it will create unmanageable 
workloads for trial and appellate courts, in addition to creating 
                                                                                                                     
 193. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, Cal. Prop. 66, https://www.oag.ca.gov/ 
system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0096%20%28Death%20Penalty%29_0.pdf.  
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complications for the California Supreme Court in reviewing decisions 
of lower court judges who do not have experience handling capital habeas 
petitions.202 These fears, however, seem unwarranted. Although state 
habeas petitions would initially burden trial and appellate courts 
disproportionately in light of the backlog of habeas corpus petitioners 
awaiting review, this effect would lessen as the backlog is reduced. The 
Proposition additionally caveats that a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
should be heard by the trial court which imposed the sentence, unless 
good cause is shown for the petition to be heard by another court. If good 
cause is interpreted to include the consideration of judicial resources, 
caseloads will remain manageable. Moreover, “[t]rial court judges are 
uniquely qualified to hear original habeas corpus claims because they are 
already familiar with the evidence presented at trial.”203 
The Proposition’s requirement that trial and appellate court judges 
hearing the petition issue written orders explaining their decisions will 
also help in relieving delays. As the law in California stands, the 
California Supreme Court is not required to issue an order detailing its 
decision, which “places the burden on federal district courts to determine 
whether the death row inmate’s federal constitutional claims have 
merit.”204 Still, the Proposition could go further in reducing delays by 
“permit[ting] the [California] Supreme Court to exercise its discretion 
whether to review the opinion of a California Court of Appeal in 
affirming or denying a [trial] court’s judgment in a state habeas corpus 
proceeding.”205 This would eliminate an unnecessary step in the review 
process when the California Supreme Court has no reason to believe that 
a capital petitioner’s claims have merit.  
2.  Appointment of Counsel 
In addition to the Proposition’s proposed legal structure for reviewing 
state habeas corpus petitions, it newly requires trial courts to take on the 
responsibility of appointing counsel to prisoners after a death sentence is 
imposed.206 Trial courts, inherently aware of when a death sentence has 
been imposed, are arguably in the best position to reduce the over eight 
year delay that exists between sentencing and the California Supreme 
Court’s appointment of habeas counsel.207 However, this provision of the 
Proposition ignores the Commission Report’s finding that delays in 
appointment of counsel are largely due to the underfunding and 
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 204. Id. at 744. 
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inadequate compensation of counsel.208 
The Proposition’s provisions regarding appointment of counsel at the 
direct appeal are even more concerning. The Proposition provides that  
[w]hen necessary to remove a substantial backlog in 
appointment of counsel for capital cases, the [California] 
Supreme Court shall require attorneys who are qualified for 
appointment to the most serious non-capital appeals and who 
meet the qualifications for capital appeals to accept 
appointment in capital cases as a condition for remaining on 
the court’s appointment list.209  
This aims to reduce the current delays of three to five years in the 
appointment of counsel to handle the direct appeal. But much like delays 
in appointment of state habeas counsel, delays in the appointment of 
counsel to handle the direct appeal are attributable to inadequate 
compensation.210  
Although placing the burden on trial courts to appoint state habeas 
counsel is a helpful, albeit small, step in reducing delays, requiring 
appellate attorneys to accept appointments to remain on the appointment 
list may “open a floodgate of new ineffective assistance of counsel cases 
due to an increased number of incompetent, unqualified, [and] 
improperly trained lawyers taking death penalty cases.”211 It is also 
questionable whether forced appointments would even aid in reducing 
delays considering that a survey of appellate attorneys found that 73% 
would rather retire or leave the appointment list than be forced to take on 
capital cases.212 Moreover, requiring trial courts to appoint state habeas 
counsel and permitting the California Supreme Court to require appellate 
counsel to accept appointments both overlook the role that inadequate 
compensation plays in the availability of attorneys willing to accept 
appointment.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 208. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 52–54; Alarcón Advocacy Center, supra 
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Addressing inadequate compensation would more effectively reduce 
delays in appointment of counsel as well as the myriad of delays resulting 
therefrom. The Commission Report proposed that “[t]he most direct and 
efficient way to reduce the backlog of death row inmates awaiting 
appointment of appellate counsel would be to . . . expand the Office of 
the State Public Defender.”213 “[T]o the extent appointments of private 
counsel are utilized,” the Commission Report recommended that they “be 
fully compensated at rates that are commensurate with the provision of 
high quality legal representation and reflect the extraordinary 
responsibilities in death penalty representation.”214 To address delays in 
appointment of state habeas counsel, the Commission Report similarly 
suggested that California expand its habeas corpus resource center and 
ensure that appointed counsel are sufficiently compensated.215   
3.  The Filing and Deciding of State Habeas Petitions 
With respect to timeframes, the Proposition requires that state habeas 
counsel file the initial habeas petition within one year of appointment, 
unless limited exceptions apply.216 Attorneys were previously given three 
years from the date of their appointment to file the habeas petition.217 
Although limiting the filing time to one year will reduce delays, it may 
force attorneys to spend less of their already limited time and resources 
in preparing the initial petition. Because the failure to fully investigate a 
petitioner’s claims at the state habeas level significantly influences delays 
at the federal habeas level, the one-year filing timeline may very well 
contribute to delays instead of remedying them. Providing adequate 
compensation and funding to state habeas counsel would be a more 
effective way for the Proposition to reduce delays in the filing of state 
habeas claims. Adequate compensation would lead to the availability of 
more state habeas counsel which would in turn reduce delays in filing 
because counsel would have more time to dedicate to each petition. 
Increasing funding to counsel would at the same time assure that claims 
are fully investigated at the state habeas level, thus reducing delays in 
federal habeas review.218  
Once the initial habeas petition is filed, the Proposition requires that 
the trial court resolve it within one year, unless “delay is necessary to 
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 214. Id. at 49. 
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resolve a substantial claim of actual innocence, but in no instance shall 
the court take longer than two years to resolve the petition.”219 Because 
the current delay between the filing of a state habeas petition and the 
California Supreme Court ruling on it is only 22 months, this provision 
would at best only minimally reduce delay. Opponents of the Proposition 
argue that assuming habeas corpus petitions are distributed in accordance 
with the counties issuing death sentences, capital caseloads may demand 
over 100% of a trial court’s judicial resources, displacing, rather than 
remedying delay.220 However, the burden on judicial resources would 
lessen as the backlog of habeas petitions is reduced, or could be avoided 
altogether if “good cause” is interpreted to consider judicial resources.  
The Proposition further requires that the Judicial Counsel “adopt 
initial rules and standards of administration designed to expedite the 
processing of capital appeals and state habeas corpus review” so that state 
courts may complete the automatic appeal and initial state habeas review 
“[w]ithin five years of the adoption of the initial rules or the entry of 
judgment, whichever is later.”221 This would be a drastic reduction from 
the average delay of twelve years that the Commission Report found to 
exist between the imposition of a death sentence and the issuance of the 
California Supreme Court’s decision on the habeas petition.222 The 
Alarcón Advocacy Center has opined, however, that  
[d]eciding all capital appeals and state post-conviction 
petitions within five years is not only not feasible or 
advisable—it is not possible. The California Supreme Court 
is required under the California Constitution to hear all 
direct appeals in capital cases, but it cannot keep up with the 
pace of new death sentences. The Court currently has a 
backlog of over 150 fully briefed capital appeals and habeas 
petitions that are awaiting oral argument and final 
disposition. Hundreds more are in the pipeline, many where 
counsel has yet to be appointed, and a steady stream of new 
cases behind those with no end in sight.223 
One proposed solution to the California Supreme Court’s backlog that 
could allow for initial state habeas petitions to be decided more quickly 
is giving California Courts of Appeal jurisdiction to review automatic 
appeals from death penalty judgments.224 Under this proposal, the 
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California Supreme Court should be given the discretion to grant or deny 
a motion for review of a Court of Appeal’s decision in an automatic 
appeal.225 This revised review of automatic appeals would result in a vast 
reduction of the back log of cases currently awaiting the California 
Supreme Court’s review.  
4.  Responses to California’s Death Penalty Reform and Savings  
Act of 2016 
The day after the Proposition was passed, opponents filed a suit to 
enjoin it from taking effect, arguing that its deadlines would set “an 
inordinately short timeline for the courts to review those complex cases 
and result in attorneys cutting corners in their investigations.”226 Though 
its constitutionality thus remains unclear, the Proposition’s proposed 
review cycle for state habeas claims could prove instrumental in reducing 
California’s delays. The Proposition’s provisions regarding appointment 
of counsel and the filing and deciding of state habeas petitions, however, 
fail to address that the underlying cause of California’s delays in 
appointment of counsel is inadequate compensation. The Proposition also 
fails to provide meaningful reductions in delays at the automatic appeal, 
rendering the Proposition incapable of drastically reducing the California 
Supreme Court’s backlog. 
IV.  PROPOSING A SOLUTION TO SYSTEMATIC DELAY 
Pre-execution delay is problematic for inmates on death row—even 
if not yet declared unconstitutional—and a solution is necessary to uphold 
the purposes of the death penalty. Therefore, this Note proposes 
recommendations for legislation to reduce and prevent pre-execution 
delay occurring at the automatic appeal and state habeas level of review 
and analyzes why the recommendations are more effective and 
comprehensive than existing legislation.  
Every state should establish comprehensive legislation to reduce and 
prevent pre-execution delay occurring at the direct appeal and state 
habeas level of review. In doing so, the importance of states conducting 
in depth assessments of their own death penalty systems cannot be 
understated; states must ensure that their legislation addresses any delays 
and problems unique to their death penalty systems. Nonetheless, at a 
minimum, state legislation should define systematic delay using the same 
definition as the court in Jones. This definition encompasses delay 
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occurring “at each stage of the post-conviction review process, including 
from the time the death sentence is issued.”227 Using that definition, state 
legislation should set out sections addressing delay both at the direct 
appeal and state habeas review. Addressing delay within state control will 
resultantly reduce delay in federal habeas review because delay at the 
direct appeal and state habeas review has a spill over effect. State 
legislation should also refrain from creating time-certain deadlines for 
postconviction review proceedings because at least some delay is 
necessary to ensure that constitutional protections are upheld. Instead, 
legislation should set timelines for appointment of counsel, filing of 
briefs, and issuance of decisions, but allow courts discretion to grant time 
extensions in exceptional circumstances. 
A.  Recommendations for Direct Appeals 
The state legislation should first provide state courts of appeal 
jurisdiction to review direct appeals from death penalty sentences.228 The 
courts of appeal should review orders of trial courts within their district 
and should issue opinions in each death penalty case.229 State supreme 
courts should then have discretion to grant or deny a motion for review 
of a court of appeal’s decision on a direct appeal of a death sentence.230 
Providing state courts of appeal jurisdiction over direct appeals would 
reduce California’s backlog of cases awaiting direct appeal to the 
California Supreme Court and would reduce or prevent similar delays in 
other states. Present federal law supports this proposal:   
A federal death row inmate convicted in federal court of a 
capital offense does not have the right to a direct appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over cases reviewed by a United States Court of 
Appeals ‘[b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of 
any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after 
rendition of judgment or decree.’ Thus, a writ of certiorari is 
‘not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.231 
State legislation must also provide adequate compensation to counsel 
willing to represent capital defendants on direct appeal. As California’s 
death penalty systems shows, inadequate compensation of counsel can 
significantly contribute to delays in appointment of appellate counsel. 
Ensuring that counsel for capital defendants are adequately compensated 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones 
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would accordingly help to reduce and prevent delay. In addition to raising 
the hourly rate for appellate counsel, state legislation should impose 
reasonable timelines for the appointment of counsel, filing of claims, and 
issuance of decisions on review of direct appeals, allowing courts the 
discretion to grant time extensions.  
B.  Recommendations for Direct Habeas Review 
Like California’s Proposition, legislation should reorganize the state 
habeas review cycle. State habeas petitions should be filed in the trial 
court where the judgment of death was entered. Legislation should also 
provide the right to appeal the denial of a state habeas petition to the state 
courts of appeal. Both the trial and appellate court judges should be 
required to issue written orders explaining their decisions. Going further 
than California’s Proposition, the highest state court should be permitted 
to exercise its discretion whether to review a state court of appeal’s 
opinion affirming or denying a trial court’s judgment on a state habeas 
petition.  
Much like the recommendations for direct appeal, state legislation 
must also provide adequate compensation to counsel willing to represent 
capital defendants at the state habeas level. State legislation should 
further impose timelines similar to California’s Proposition for the 
appointment of counsel, filing of claims, and issuance of decisions on 
state habeas petitions, while permitting courts to grant time extensions. 
Unlike California, whose Proposition fails to address California’s 
inadequate compensation of counsel, if counsel is adequately 
compensated, implementing time constraints on the filing of petitions 
should alleviate, rather than contribute to delay.  
Although not contemplated under Florida’s Act nor California’s 
Proposition, state legislatures should additionally explore the possibility 
of establishing a jointly funded state and federal capital habeas agency. 
Continuity of counsel from the state to the federal habeas level would 
ensure that claims are adequately investigated and would reduce delay 
attributable to the failure to exhaust available state remedies.232  
C.  Recommendations for Monitoring Delays and Counsel 
Beyond changes to the direct appeal and state habeas review, 
legislation should put in place a system to monitor capital cases and their 
counsel as the cases proceed through the postconviction review process. 
Similar to Florida’s Act, legislation should require courts to report the 
status of any capital case that has had an appeal or petition pending for 
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more than three years. States should use this information to further assess 
and refine their legislation to ensure that it has the effect of reducing 
postconviction delay. State legislation should also adopt a provision 
similar to the provision in Florida’s Act prohibiting attorneys from 
representing a capital defendant for five years if, on two separate 
occasions, an attorney provided constitutionally deficient representation 
in capital postconviction proceedings for which relief was granted. 
Unlike Florida, whose Act fails to address the ABA’s finding that counsel 
is under-compensated, if counsel is adequately compensated, a provision 
like this should not result in a significant reduction of counsel able to 
represent capital defendants. Lastly, state legislation should, like 
Florida’s Act, regulate the issuance of a warrant to execute the death 
sentence for any convicted capital defendant whose sentence is final 
because this will ensure that warrants for executions are carried out in a 
timely manner.   
CONCLUSION 
If states are going to continue implementing the death penalty, 
systematic delay must be addressed in order to ensure its 
constitutionality. This Note offers a solution to the systematic delay 
recently identified in California—delay that other states may also be 
experiencing. The most challenging aspect of enacting legislation to 
resolve systematic delay will undoubtedly be ensuring that constitutional 
protections are not lost to expediency. On one hand, delays in 
postconviction review may render the death penalty arbitrary. However, 
on the other, expedited postconviction review may present violations of 
due process, equal protection, and the Eighth Amendment’s ban of cruel 
and unusual punishment. It will be critical for legislation to strike a 
balance that provides timely capital postconviction review while also 
protecting these constitutional interests, particularly considering that we 
live in a nation that often fails to get sentences right as the system stands 
today.233  
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